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Speculation Disguised as Results

Richardson, R.C. 2007: Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass and London. 248 pp., $30.00; £19.95. ISBN 978-0-262-18260-7.

Reviewed by David J. Buller, Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb,
IL 60115, USA. Email: buller@niu.edu

The title of Philip Kitcher’s (1985) critique of sociobiology, Vaulting Ambition, was drawn from
Macbeth: “vaulting ambition, which o’er-leaps itself.” This neatly encapsulated Kitcher’s message: The
reach of (pop) sociobiology’s claims exceeded the grasp of its evidential support. Robert Richardson, a
philosopher at University of Cincinnati, says the same of evolutionary psychology: “Evolutionary
psychology as currently practiced is often speculation disguised as results” (p. 12). As Richardson
characterizes it, evolutionary psychology assumes the human mind is a set of species-specific, universal
psychological adaptations, and it aims to explain how selection designed those psychological adaptations
during our lineage’s Pleistocene past (p. 13). But, Richardson argues, adaptationist explanations in
evolutionary psychology consistently fall woefully short of meeting the evidential standards to which
adaptationist explanations within evolutionary biology are held. Accordingly, we should “reject the
pretensions of evolutionary psychology largely as unconstrained speculation, as claims ungrounded in
evolutionary history” (p. 38).
Richardson makes his case in the book’s central chapters by considering three approaches to the
empirical evaluation of adaptationist hypotheses. Chapter 2 discusses “reverse engineering,” inferring the
adaptive function of a trait from its structure and then reconstructing evolutionary history from adaptive
function. Chapter 3 considers what Richardson calls the “dynamic approach,” which involves gathering

data regarding trait heritability, ancestral population structure, ancestral ecological conditions, and
strength of selection in those conditions. Chapter 4 focuses on the (phylogenetic) comparative method.
Each of these chapters follows the same formula. First Richardson lays out the details of the
empirical approach under consideration, with attention to the evidential standards against which a
hypothesis regarding adaptation must be judged. Then he offers a case study, drawn from evolutionary
biology, in meeting those standards. The function of this step of Richardson’s argument is to demonstrate
that he is not fabricating impossibly high standards for adaptationist explanations; rather, he is drawing on
“the standards from respectable work in evolutionary biology” (p. 38). Finally, Richardson examines
sample adaptationist claims from evolutionary psychology and shows how they fall far short of meeting
the empirical standards under consideration.
Richardson also suggests that it is unlikely that evolutionary psychologists ever could meet
respectable evidential standards if the objective is to provide adaptationist explanations of uniquely
human psychological traits. For such explanations would need to be supported by phylogenetic analysis,
and, because humans occupy such a sparsely populated clade, “what is known of hominid phylogeny ... is
just not enough to support the program of evolutionary psychology” (p. 158). This argument has also
been compellingly made by the philosopher Jonathan Kaplan (2002), most recently in his collaboration
with the evolutionary biologist Massimo Pigliucci (Pigliucci & Kaplan 2006).
Richardson’s arguments are informed, informative, and incisive, and they provide an important
cautionary brief against the adaptationist program in evolutionary psychology. That said, there are a
couple of small problems.
First, Richardson advertises his arguments as critical of “evolutionary psychology,” but is not
careful to circumscribe the intended scope of that term. In a broad sense — what Dunbar and Barrett
(2007) call “evolutionary psychology in the round” — evolutionary psychology is simply the
evolutionary study of human behavior and mentality. In a narrower sense, the term has been used to
describe a particular research program within this field — namely, the research program of “the Santa
Barbara school” (Laland & Brown 2002), or “Evolutionary Psychology” (Buller 2005), whose “members”
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include David Buss, Leda Cosmides, Steven Pinker, and John Tooby. All of Richardson’s arguments in
fact target explanations offered by Santa Barbarians — Buss on jealousy, Cosmides and Tooby on
cognition, and Pinker on language. But demolishing those targets doesn’t thereby lay waste to
“evolutionary psychology in the round.” In fact, I think that some work in the field does an excellent job
of meeting the empirical standards that Richardson endorses (see, e.g., Hawkes 2003). So greater care
about the scope of the critique would have been welcome.
Second, Richardson gets a couple minor points of exposition wrong. For example, he claims that
Tooby and Cosmides “see human reason as, specifically, an adaptation for social exchange” (p. 142; cf.
pp. 19 and 134). This isn’t quite right. According to Tooby and Cosmides (1992) “human reason” isn’t a
unitary phenomenon; rather, what we call “human reason” consists of “hundreds or thousands” of
specialized cognitive processes (Tooby & Cosmides 2000). Some, but not all, of these cognitive
processes are adaptations for social exchange (notably their postulated “cheater-detection module”).
But these minor problems do not affect the soundness of the arguments that Richardson does
provide against the sorts of adaptationist explanations offered by Santa Barbara-style evolutionary
psychologists. Those arguments are on target and, I believe, decisive.
But will evolutionary psychologists listen to the message, recognize some of the inherent
limitations of their investigations, rein in their unsubstantiated speculations, and try to meet a higher
empirical standard in their explanations? I doubt it. There is a lamentable tendency among too many
evolutionary psychologists to view the world as divided into “allies” and “enemies” and then, naturally, to
see any criticism as coming from “enemies” (see, e.g., Daly & Wilson 2008, p. 396). This tendency
becomes toxic to rational debate when it is claimed that critics are “not just sceptical, they are angry, and
we are still not entirely sure what they are angry about” (Daly & Wilson 2008, p. 396). The absence of a
reason for “anger” is actually evidence that criticism isn’t motivated by anger. Indeed, I challenge the
reader to find one hint of anger in Richardson’s book (or, for that matter, in Buller 2005). What the
reader will find is the measured execution of the Socratic commitment to critical inquiry. It appears
impossible for some to entertain and reflect upon the option that fellow evolutionists actually have honest
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intellectual disagreements with much of the evolutionary psychology program and that those
disagreements stem from considerations having to do with evolutionary theory itself and its use in
explaining human behavior.
It is unfortunately common for evolutionists to feel that they are locked in a battle with (various
forms of) creationists for the educational future of Western Civilization (see, e.g., Pigliucci & Kaplan
2006, pp. 269-270). I’m not unsympathetic to that feeling. But evolutionists can show themselves to be
essentially different from their religious opposition by demonstrating an unwavering commitment to the
ideals of critical inquiry, even if that means welcoming criticism of some of our most deeply held beliefs
about evolution. If criticism is summarily dismissed with arguments ad hominem, rather than considered
seriously, the evolutionary community begins to resemble the religious communities it opposes.
So, if you value critical inquiry more than partisan rhetoric; if you believe that scientific
knowledge grows through both “conjectures and refutations” (in the famous words of Popper 1992); and
if you find intellectual fulfillment in contemplating both sides of a debate; then you will find
Richardson’s book interesting and valuable. On the other hand, if you’re already convinced that any
criticism of evolutionary psychology must be part of an angry campaign of persecution; if you believe
that scientific knowledge grows by allowing weakly supported conjecture to go unchallenged; and if you
believe that perhaps the Athenians were right to execute Socrates for his “irreverent” public questioning
of established opinion; then you don’t have to read this book to know you don’t like it.
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